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I. INTRODUCTION
Michael was always a bright child, eager to learn and take on new
challenges.' Now a senior in college at a nationally ranked university,
Michael is a Finance and Marketing double major with a 3.4 grade point
average. Michael's passion for the stock market has inspired him to pursue
a career as an investment banker in a large New York City investment firm.
Given his impressive resume and keen interview skills, Michael has
received many enticing offers for employment upon graduation. Yet, while
Michael is a young man of seemingly limitless potential, he faces great
obstacles that could obstruct his Wall Street dreams.
Michael is different from most college students. He has struggled
with learning disabilities his entire life, specifically with Attention Deficit
Disorder (ADD) and disabilities in auditory processing and visual
perception. While Michael's intelligence and determination are critical
factors to his academic success, his achievements are also dependent on the
numerous accommodations he receives for his learning disabilities.2
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1. Michael's story is based on a true account of a student who has struggled with
learning disabilities. The name of the student has been changed to protect the student's
privacy.
2. In light of the increase of disabled students pursuing higher education, most
universities have developed disability coordinators and disability offices that readily provide
accommodations to students with disabilities. See Linda Lee, To Teach, or Merely
Accommodate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, at ED30 ("[According to a 1998] study by the
American Council on Education, the number of college freshmen identifying themselves as
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Michael meets with each of his professors before the semester begins to
give them his "Letter of Accommodation," which documents his learning
disabilities and recommends accommodations, which in turn are
implemented by the professors. To ensure that he is free from distractions,
Michael takes his examinations in a private room in the disability office.
Additionally, he is allowed 'time and a half' to complete all exams and
assignments.3 To help counter his limited attention span, Michael always
sits in the front of the classroom and tape records each lecture for later
study. Upon request, the university also provides tutors in all subjects, and
note takers who attend class and take notes for learning disabled students.
Michael takes advantage of both of these services.
While these accommodations have enabled Michael to excel
academically, he faces a terrific challenge upon graduation. Although
colleges have made great strides in accommodating learning disabilities,
the workplace remains a mostly uncharted terrain. This article explores the
particular obstacles that individuals like Michael must overcome when
trying to obtain accommodations in the workplace. More specifically, this
article addresses the impediments posed by the current Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations that make recovery for a
learning disabled employee under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) virtually impossible. This article aims to rectify this problem by
altering the current EEOC standard, which calls for comparing a learning
disabled individual to the average person in the population in determining
if he meets the definition of disabled under the ADA. This article proposes
that learning disabled individuals should be compared to others with
similar skills and backgrounds so that their achievements will not
undermine their ability to receive accommodations.
Part I offers a definition and explanation of learning disabilities,
specifically focusing on the impediments caused by ADD. Part II
examines the ADA and its relationship to the learning disabilities arena.
This section specifically discusses the standard of proof necessary to secure
accommodations under the ADA and the role of various agencies in
interpreting the ADA's definition of disability. Part III discusses the many
barriers impeding recovery for learning disabled employees.
Part IV details courts' consistent inability to find protection for
learning disabled has almost tripled from 1988 to 1998, to 58,000 freshmen - the fastest-
growing category of all disabilities."). To obtain accommodations for a learning disability,
students are merely required to submit documentation of their disability and a doctor's
recommendation of appropriate accommodations to the school's disability coordinator for
review. See Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F.Supp. 106, 117 (D.Mass. 1997)
(describing the procedures followed by Boston University in providing accommodations to
the learning disabled).
3. Time and a half consists of the regular amount of time afforded other students, plus
half of that time.
A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY
learning disabled employees under the ADA. This section specifically
highlights the EEOC's proposed standard and the manner in which it
hampers recovery by compelling a demographic comparison group that
consistently results in the determination that leaming disabled individuals
fail to qualify for protection under the ADA. Part V recommends that the
nature of learning disabilities would support using similarly educated
individuals as the comparison group for determining if an individual is
disabled under the ADA, rather than the average person in the general
population. It explains how the current standard precludes academically
successful students like Michael from receiving accommodations in the
workplace because their disability status is undermined by their academic
achievements. Concluding in Part VI, this article demonstrates how the
proposed comparison group would help learning disabled individuals
secure the accommodations in the workplace necessary to their success.
II. DEFINING LEARNING DISABILITIES
To empathize with Michael's plight, it is essential to first understand
the difficulties encountered by individuals with learning disabilities. As
defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a
"learning disability" is a "disorder in one or more of the basic
psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language,
spoken or written, which ...may manifest itself in imperfect ability to
listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.
' 4
Believed to be caused by a malfunction of the central nervous system,5 the
effects of a learning disability may include specific deficits in one or more
of the following areas: oral comprehension, organization, coordination,
perception, expressive language, the ability to sustain attention, nonverbal
reasoning, integration of information, and social judgment.6  Learning
disabilities can be diagnosed by a psychologist or physician through a
series of tests that examine whether an individual has a noticeable disparity
between intelligence and achievement.7 Despite the myth that learning
4. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(30)(A) (West 2006).
5. Lisa Eichhom, Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises: Issues
Concerning Learning Disabled Students and Professional Schools in the Law School
Context, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 31, 34 (1997).
6. See Hilary Greer Fike, Learning Disabilities in the Workplace: A Guide to ADA
Compliance, 20 SEATTLE UNIV. L.R. 489, 492 (1997) (listing some of the deficits associated
with learning disabilities).
7. Id. Jeff Brown, a learning disabled attorney, describes this disparity:
Even though I have nineteen years of formal education, I cringe whenever
someone asks me to spell a simple word, and I still am angered when I cannot
look up a word in the dictionary because I cannot spell. Although I understand
complex ideas and concepts, I still have trouble knowing where to put a comma
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disabilities are akin to mental retardation and result in limited intelligence,
learning disabled individuals are typically of average or above average
intelligence
While there are many different types of learning disabilities, one of
the most common is ADD, which impinges on an individual's ability to pay
attention and learn effectively. 9 Affecting approximately eight million
American adults,'" ADD is a neurological disorder that impairs parts of the
brain "responsible for decision-making [sic], judgment, and
concentration."" Because ADD affects a person's ability to learn and to
retain knowledge, it often results in underachievement.
2
ADD creates a constant battle with forgetfulness, restlessness, and an
inability to stay focused. 3 Other characteristics include disorganization,
inattentiveness, and failure to attend to details, resulting in many seemingly
careless mistakes.' 4 Accordingly, those who suffer from ADD often have
trouble finishing tasks, following instructions, organizing large amounts of
information, remembering appointments, and being on time. 5
Recommended accommodations for individuals with ADD "include room
in a sentence.... I read, but not like a normal individual. I am unable to sound
out words.
Jeff Brown, A Learning-Disabled Lawyer's Perspective: A Response to "Lowering the
Bar " Integrity, Stereotypical Attitudes and Reasonable Accommodations, 42 S. TEX. L. REV.
129, 134 (2001).
8. See Fike, supra note 6, at 493 ("Typically, individuals with learning disabilities
have average or above average intelligence."); Paul J. Gerber, At First Glance: Employment
for People with Learning Disabilities at the Beginning of the Americans-with-Disabilities-
Act Era, 15 LEARNING DISABILITY Q. 330, 331 (1992) ("[S]ometimes 'learning disability' is
confused with mental retardation, attention-deficit disorder, and other disabilities.").
9. See generally Lisa Belkin, Office Messes, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 18, 2004, at 24
(discussing attention deficit disorder within a work environment).
10. Id. at 26. ADD is the second-most common psychological problem in adults after
depression. Id.
11. Scott Lemond & David Mizgala, Identifying and Accommodating the Learning-
Disabled Lawyer, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 72 (2001).
12. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 78-80 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing the diagnostic features of Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder).
13. See id. at 78 ("[I]ndividuals often have difficulty sustaining attention in tasks ...
and find it hard to persist with tasks until completion."). For example, a doctor describes a
patient's struggle with ADD: "Her friends in college teased her about her constant need to
move some part of her body. She described being distracted by any sound. She recalled
examples . . . of listening to what was going on in the hall rather than in class." LARRY B.
SILVER, M.D., THE MISUNDERSTOOD CHILD: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS OF LEARNING DISABLED
CHILDREN 279-80 (1992).
14. Id.
15. See Sande L. Buhai, Practice Makes Perfect: Reasonable Accommodation of Law
Students with Disabilities in Clinical Placements, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 161 (1999)
(discussing some characteristics of persons with attention deficit disorder and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder).
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dividers, partitions, soundproofing, or visual barriers" as well as "[m]oving
the individual to a quieter location, lowering the pitch of telephones, or
permitting use of headphones to block distractions."
6
Ill. LEARNING DISABILITIES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT
While learning disabilities are also covered by Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act' 7 and the IDEA,'8 this article only focuses on the
coverage of learning disabilities within the ADA.' 9 Enacted in 1990 to
''provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"2 ° the ADA protects the
disabled from discrimination in "employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services".2
The first three titles of the statute are relevant to the protection of
individuals with learning disabilities. Title I applies to employers,2
employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint-labor management
23committees. It ultimately prevents discrimination against a "qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment., 24  Title II addresses public
entities, including any state or local government, and any departments,
agencies, special purpose districts, or other instrumentalities of a state or
local government.25 This title protects a qualified individual with a
disability from being "excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 216 Title III prohibits public
accommodations and services operated by private entities from
16. Peter S. Latham & Patricia H. Latham, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Issues New Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities and the ADA, ATrENTION!, Fall 1997, at
38.
17. 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West 1999).
18. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West 2000).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2005).
20. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
21. Id. § 12101(a)(3).
22. The term "employer" is defined under the ADA as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 1211 1(5)(A).
23. Id. § 12111(2).
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2005).
25. Id. § 12131(1).
26. Id. § 12132.
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discriminating against individuals with disabilities.27 Undergraduate and
postgraduate private schools are included under Title III's protection.28
A. The Role ofAgencies in Interpreting the ADA
The task of interpreting the ambiguous language of the ADA
including terms such as "physical or mental impairment, '2 9 "substantially
limits"30 and "major life activities,",31 falls primarily on the EEOC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ).32 Consequently, courts must grapple with the
issue of what deference should be attached to the regulatory guidelines that
are issued by these agencies.33 Generally, if the intent of Congress is clear
from the language of the statute itself, the court "must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 34 If the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to a certain issue, the court has discretion whether
to defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute.35
In determining whether to defer to the agency's interpretation, the
court is typically guided by two principles. First, the court asks whether
Congress has delegated to an agency, either implicitly or explicitly, the
authority to explain a specific provision of the statute by regulation. 6
Second, if such delegation is found, the court will then give legislative
regulations "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. 37
Such deference is supported by the notion that Congress expressly
delegated authority to the EEOC and the DOJ to promulgate regulations
27. Id. § 12181.
28. Id. § 12181(7)(J).
29. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled: The Relationship
between the Definition of Disability and Rights under the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 3-4
(Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES] (discussing the interpretation of the ADA's ambiguous language); Mary
Crossley, Impairment and Embodiment, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra, at 113
(discussing the Supreme Court's reliance on the EEOC's interpretive guidelines on
pregnancy).
33. See Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 32, at 3 ("[The language in the ADA] is
amenable to an infinite array of interpretations."); Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The
Supreme Court's Nearsighted View of the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra
note 32, at 125 (discussing the Supreme Court's lack of deference to "the clear legislative
history... as well as the view of the federal agency charged with interpreting" the ADA).
34. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 843-44.
37. Id. at 844.
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filling in the gaps created by the statute and explaining ambiguous terms."
However, courts do occasionally refuse to defer to the EEOC regulations in
interpreting Title I provisions, reasoning that Congress did not delegate
authority to the EEOC to draft regulations with respect to terms defined
outside the employment provisions of the ADA.39  As a result, any
deference that Congress may have given the EEOC in interpreting Title I of
the ADA is unclear.
In addition to the regulations, the EEOC Interpretative Guidance
interprets the statute. However, the EEOC did not intend for the
Interpretive Guidance to be given the same weight as the regulations.4" For
example, in the introduction of the Interpretative Guidance for ADA Title I,
the EEOC states that it aims to be "guided by" the Interpretive Guidance,
rather than bound by it. 4' Additionally, Courts have given less deference to
the Interpretive Guidance. Judge Kennedy, in Gilday v. Mecosta County,
states:
The appendix constitutes a set of interpretative, rather than
legislative, rules and is, therefore, not binding law.
Nevertheless, "[s]uch administrative interpretations . . . [']do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' An
interpretive rule is still entitled to "some deference" where the
rule is a "permissible construction of the statute. ' '4
B. The ADA's Definition of "Disability"
A disability is defined under the ADA as: "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment., 43 The Supreme Court has stated
that the terms "major". and "substantial" are to be interpreted strictly, to
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. 44 The Court has
declared that the word "substantially" in the phrase "substantially limits"
should be read as "considerable" or "to a large degree," and therefore does
38. Cf Mayerson & Diller, supra note 33 (illustrating the Supreme Court's deviation
from legislative history and the agency charged with ADA interpretation).
39. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (refusing to
defer to the EEOC regulations in holding that mitigating factors should be included in
assessing if a person is disabled under the ADA).
40. See infra note 41.
41. EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630 (2006).
42. 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
44. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
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not include impairments that interfere in only a minor way with performing
manual tasks.45 Moreover, because "major" means important, "major life
activities" refers to "those activities that are of central importance to daily
life."
46
Additionally, the EEOC regulations list several factors to be
considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in
a major activity, such as the nature and severity of the impairment, the
duration or expected duration of the impairment, and the actual or expected
permanent or long-term impact of the impairment.4' Examples of major
life activities listed in the EEOC's regulations include functions such as
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 48
The term disability is evaluated in terms of the individual.49
Consequently, courts determine whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity on a case-by-case basis. 0 For this reason,
the ADA does not attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that constitute
disabilities.5 1 Instead, the determination of whether an individual is
disabled under the ADA is based on the effect of a particular impairment
on the individual's life.52 Thus, "[s]ome impairments may be disabling for
particular individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the
disease or disorder, [and] the presence of other impairments that combine
to make the impairment disabling," such as social and environmental
45. Id. at 196.
46. Id. at 197.
47. EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (2006); see also Carroll v. Xerox
Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 244 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying these factors to find that plaintiffs
anxiety disorder did not "substantially limit" his ability to work, affirming the district court's
grant of summary judgment with respect to the disability discrimination claims and
dismissal of the state common law claims). It is important to note that any restrictions on
the performance of a major life activity must be the result of a condition that is an
impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (defining "substantially limits"). Advanced age,
physical or personality characteristics, and environmental, cultural, and economic
disadvantages are not impairments. See id. § 1630.2(h) (defining "physical or mental
impairment").
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
50. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477 (1999) (affirming the trial
court's dismissal of the applicants' claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act because
the applicants were not disabled within the meaning of the statute). But see US Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (suggesting that the statute does not require an
individualized inquiry).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.20). In an individualized assessment, "[w]e do not
decide whether every diabetic is disabled, and we do not decide whether every severely
obese person is not disabled." Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.20).
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factors.53 The determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled under the
ADA requires a fact-based analysis which includes, among other
considerations, the nature and severity of impairment,54  and the
effectiveness and burdens of mitigating measures used by the plaintiff.5
Although learning disabilities are not expressly included in the
language of the ADA, they are included in the EEOC's interpretation of the
Act.5 6 According to the EEOC, a disability includes "[a]ny mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities., 57 Further
evidence that learning disabilities are covered under the ADA exists in the
EEOC's guidelines, which includes "learning" as an example of a major
life activity the ADA has been interpreted to cover. 8
C. Obtaining Accommodations under the ADA
To obtain accommodations under the ADA, an employee must first
establish that he is a "qualified individual with a disability."59 For the court
to make this determination under Title I, the individual must have a
disability, be discriminated against on the basis of it, and be able to perform
the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable
accommodation.6 ° To satisfy the essential functions of the job position, the
individual must display "the requisite skill, experience, education, and
other job-related requirements of the employment position" at stake.6' A
job function is considered essential if the "position exists to perform that
function ... [if a] limited number of employees [are] available" to perform
that job function, or if the function is highly specialized so that an
"incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to
perform the particular function., 62 In determining the essential functions of
the position, courts generally give substantial consideration to those
53. Id.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i).
55. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481 (affirming the trial court's dismissal of the applicants'
claims under the ADA because the applicants were not disabled within the meaning of the
statute).
56. Congress authorized the EEOC to issue regulations regarding Subchapter I, which
addresses workplace discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2005).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2005). Specific learning disabilities include deficiencies
in reading, arithmetic, memory, and organization skills among many others. Craig Lerner,
"Accommodations "for the Learning Disabled: A Level Playing Field or Affirmative Action
for Elites? 57 VAND. L. REv. 1043, 1074 (2004).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2005).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2005) (citations omitted).
60. Id.
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2005).
62. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2) (2005).
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functions listed in a written job description prepared by the employer.63
Reasonable accommodations under the ADA may include "making
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities, . . . job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, [and] acquisition[s] or
modification[s] of equipment or devices." 64  Other accommodations
determined to be reasonable include the "adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials, or policies," as well as the provision of
qualified readers and interpreters.65
Employers are allowed to discriminate against individuals with
disabilities if they are unable to perform an essential function of the
position and no reasonable accommodation would enable them to perform
that function, or the necessary accommodation would impose an undue
hardship to the employer.66  An undue hardship exists when an
accommodation would require a covered entity to incur a "significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the" nature and cost of
the necessary accommodation, the overall financial resources and size-of
the business, and the type of operation of the covered entity.67
Additionally, employers can discriminate against individuals who pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace.68
IV. BARRIERS TO RECOVERY FOR THE LEARNING DISABLED IN THE
WORKPLACE
In the university setting, special disability coordinators represent the
university's willingness to accommodate students. 69 However, upon
graduation, these same services are not available to employees with
disabilities.7 ° In this litigious age, it seems odd that few employees with
learning disabilities seek protection under the law. No landmark case
exists and according to Patricia Latham, author of a series of seminal books
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (2005); See Buhai, supra note 15, at 146 (indicating the
evidence a court will examine to determine essential function).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2005).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 12111(10)(A).
67. Id. § 12111(10).
68. See Id. § 12113(b) (creating health exceptions for employees handling food); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2005) (defining the acceptable level of health risk).
69. See generally Suzanne Abram, Chalk Talk: Reasonable Accommodations for
Learning-Disabled University Students Under the ADA, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 121 (1999)
(describing the evolution of ADA application in the university setting).
70. See David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Re-Interpreting the Effect of Rights:
Career Narratives and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 285, 331
(2001) (discussing the variety of reasons employment accommodations are less likely to be
sought).
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on disabilities and the law, "[t]he message sent by the scattered cases that
do exist . . . is not encouraging to others who might think of bringing
[lawsuits].''
While the ADA protects learning-disabled individuals in both the
university and employment settings, additional barriers exist for employees
wishing to bring claims in the workplace. 7  For example, an employee
"must show that [he is] highly debilitated by [a] disorder, yet still capable
of doing [the] job ... [with] 'reasonable accommodations.' 73 Regardless
of whether the particular impairment is a learning disability, it is always a
difficult task for an employee to prove that he is "substantially impaired
[]but not so impaired that [he does] not qualify for [the] job in the first
place., 74 Understandably, "defendants prevail in more than ninety-three
percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the
merits at the trial court level.",7' Additionally, when employees appealed
the court's decision, the judgment was affirmed eighty-four percent of the
time.76 Such results are far worse than those in other areas of law.77 Those
who counsel employees with learning disabilities and whose employers are
unwilling to provide accommodations typically advise them, "[y]ou can
sue, but you won't win. '78 Thus, the burden is on the leaming disabled
employee to help himself.
79
A. Social Barriers that Impede Recovery
The inherent difficulty in quantifying learning disabilities prevents
employers from readily providing accommodations. Combined with
employers' general lack of comprehension, the invisible nature of learning
71. Belkin, supra note 9, at 29 (citing Latham).
72. As one learning disabled graduate noted, "I thought school was the big hurdle. But
it turns out it isn't ... I really don't see that I'm ever going to eliminate the fact that I take
twice as long to do things as other people." STEPHEN T. MURPHY, ON BEING L.D.:
PERSPECTIVE AND STRATEGIES OF YOUNG ADULTS 102 (1992).
73. Belkin, supra note 9, at 29.
74. Id. at 29 (quoting Latham).
75. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (citations omitted). Results of plaintiffs prevailing
at the trial court level in ADA employment discrimination claims are most likely even
worse, since the data studied only contained reported outcomes which tend to be biased in
favor of plaintiffs. Id. at 109. See generally Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III,
Studying the Iceberg from its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished
Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 1133 (1990) (discussing the bias
inherent in reported decisions).
76. Colker, supra note 75, at 100.
77. Id. Only prisoner rights cases tend to be as difficult for plaintiffs to win. Id.
78. Belkin, supra note 9, at 8 (quoting Harold Meyer, an advisor to companies and
employees on ADD friendly workplace strategies).
79. Id.
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disabilities causes many employers to treat them as an excuse. s In fact,
twenty percent of Americans think Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) does not really exist.8' Because it is difficult for
employers to be sensitive to a syndrome whose symptoms suspiciously
look like bad work habits, 2 employers constantly question the legitimacy
of an employee who does not appear to be disabled, but claims to be. 3 As
a result, incorrect assumptions that learning-disabled individuals are simply
lazy are often made.84
Such skepticism by employers causes individuals to be hesitant about
revealing their learning disabilities once they enter the employment
85context. The learning disabled, like all individuals with hidden
disabilities, feel strong pressure to "pass for normal., 86 The advantages of
passing include "avoiding the prejudices and daily acts of discrimination
and patronizing behavior that people with obvious disabilities are subjected
to." 87 The ability to 'pass' poses an especially troubling problem "[i]f an
employer is unaware of an applicant or employee's disability, he is not
expected to accommodate the disability., 88  Yet, revealing a disability
could create a no-win situation if employers are unwilling to provide
accommodations and an individual is terminated and forced to sue.89
Because of this, most employees with learning disabilities believe
"[i]mpairment is safer not mentioned at all" and choose to keep their
disability to themselves. 90 One employee, in her decision to not reveal her
learning disabilities, reasoned that, "[w]ork isn't like school, where they
have to give you more time on the tests .... In the real world, if you tell
during the interview, they won't hire you. And if you tell after you're
hired, they can fire you.
' 9'
Such silence among learning-disabled employees often causes
80. See Gerber, supra note 8, at 330 (indicating that employers are perplexed by
learning disabilities as they are less easy to perceive).
81. William Lawson, Side Tracked: The Clash Over ADHD Diagnosis, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, September/October 2004, at 13. ADHD is essentially ADD, accompanied by "a
persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more frequent and
severe than typically observed in individuals at a comparable level of development." Price
v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F.Supp. 419, 422 (S.D.W.Va. 1997).
82. Lee, supra note 2, at 30.
83. Susan Wendell, Unhealthy Disabled: Treating Chronic Illness as Disabilities, 16
HYPATIA 17, 20 (Fall 2001).
84. Id. at 27.
85. Fike, supra note 6, at 494.
86. Wendell, supra note 83, at 21.
87. Id. at 29.
88. Fike, supra note 6, at 499.
89. See generally Belkin, supra note 9 (discussing the difficulty inherent in ADA
lawsuits).
90. Wendell, supra note 83, at 22.
91. Belkin, supra note 9, at 26.
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difficulties in maintaining employment.92  One poll indicates that adults
with ADHD held 5.4 jobs over the past ten years, in comparison to adults
without the impairment, who held only 3.4 jobs. 93 Additionally, only 52%
of adults with ADHD were employed, as compared to 72% of non-disabled
adults.94  Even drugs such as Ritalin and Adderol, which are made to
control the inattentiveness of ADD and ADHD, rarely eliminate the
additional difficulties that arise in the workplace for those struggling with
attention impairments.95
Leaming-disabled individuals also fail to reveal their disability
because they are concerned they will be seen as expecting 'special'
treatment, even though they are just attempting to level the playing field.96
They worry that employers will be disturbed by the inconvenience of
providing accommodations. 97  Additionally, they commonly fear that
asserting their rights will cause resentment among co-workers and
employers, which will result in alienation and stigmatization.98 A "politics
of resentment" motivates some employers to expect virtually every
employee, despite a given impairment, to conform to the normal workplace
demands. 99
B Trilogy of Supreme Court Cases that Contribute to Employees'
Difficulty in Prevailing Under the ADA
The Supreme Court decided three landmark ADA cases on the same
day, each having a substantial effect on a plaintiff s recovery under the Act.
These cases impact the learning disabilities arena. The three cases, Sutton
v. United Airlines, Murphy v. United Parcel Service Inc., and Albertsons,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, all raise the disability threshold bar by holding that
courts should take mitigating actions into account when assessing if a
disability substantially limits a major life activity.0 0
In Sutton v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court determined that in
92. See generally Belkin, supra note 9 (discussing the trials and tribulations of several
ADHD effected members of the work force).
93. Id. at 28.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 29.
96. Engel & Munger, supra note 70, at 331.
97. Id.
98. Id. Coworker resentment results from the fact that most workers feel frustrated by
their working conditions and their employer's demands on their time and energy. Wendell,
supra note 83, at 27.
99. Wendell, supra note 83, at 27 (citations omitted).
100. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (explaining this evolution
in the law); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (explaining this
evolution in the law); Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (explaining this
evolution in the law).
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assessing whether twin sisters who both suffered from severe myopia l1
were disabled under the ADA, the corrective lenses available that improved
the girls' eyesight should be taken into account when evaluating their
condition. 10 2 The Court held that the question of whether an individual has
a disability should be assessed with regard to mitigating measures,
concluding that a person whose physical or mental impairment was
corrected by medication or other measures did not have an impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity.'0 3
Similarly, in Murphy v. United Parcel Service Inc., the Court held that
Murphy's high blood pressure should be considered post-medication,
concluding that his hypertension was not a disability because when
medicated, "he functions normally doing everyday activities that an
everyday person does."'0 4 The Court went a step further in Albertsons Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, determining that a plaintiff who suffered from monocular
vision, an uncorrectable eye condition, was not disabled because his brain
had developed a subconscious mechanism for coping with his visual
impairment.' O5 Thus, the Supreme Court established that even corrections
by an individual's own body that compensate for a disability would negate
a claim of a substantial impairment of a major life activity.
10 6
Sutton,10 7 Murphy,0 8 and Albertsons'0 9 have greatly impacted the
ability of the learning disabled to recover under the ADA. Individuals with
learning disabilities inevitably develop coping mechanisms that help them
to successfully perform their jobs."l0 As seen in Albertsons,"' such coping
mechanisms make it difficult for individuals to qualify as disabled under
the ADA since "success negates the existence of the disability, whereas
failure justifies dismissal for incompetency." ' 2 Thus, when a plaintiff with
a learning disability exhibits compensatory abilities, he most likely will be
unable to qualify as disabled under the ADA." 3
101. Myopia is an eye condition that causes impaired vision. See
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (indicating the effects of myopia).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
105. Albertsons, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1990).
106. Id.
107. 527 U.S.at 471.
108. Id. at516.
109. Id. at 555.
110. Frances M. Nicastro, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Determining Which
Learning Disabilities Qualify for Reasonable Accommodations, 26 J. LEGis. 355.
111. 527U.S.at555.
112. Andrew Weis, Jumping to Conclusions in "Jumping the Queue, " 51 STAN. L. REv.
183,205 (1998).
113. Id.
A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY
V. COURTS' CONTINUOUS REFUSAL TO FIND PROTECTION FOR THE
LEARNING-DISABLED UNDER THE ADA
While there have been few suits for discrimination based on a learning
disability under the ADA, the case law that does exist is rather
discouraging to individuals ready to muster up the courage to sue. These
decisions demonstrate a continual trend of courts granting summary
judgment to employers, asserting that no duty exists for the employer to
accommodate the impairment because it does not qualify as "'substantially
limiting' within the meaning of the ADA."' 1 4  For example, a 1997
National Disability Law Reporter survey of ADA cases showed that a
judge found the plaintiff able to meet the statutory definition in only 6 of
the 110 cases in which the issue was raised." 5
A. The EEOC's Interpretation of the Act Hinders Recovery for Learning
Disabled Individuals.
Hardly any cases exist in which a learning-disabled plaintiff is
determined to have an impairment that rises to the level necessary for the
court to mandate that the employer provide accommodations. Courts'
consistent failure to hold that learning disabilities substantially limit a
major life activity turns on the EEOC's definition of a substantial
limitation." 6
The ADA's legislative history offers some additional guidance to the
phrase 'substantially limits.' The Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources" 7 acknowledges that substantially limiting impairments cannot
be "minor" or "trivial." ''  The legislative history further states that the
impairments must restrict an individual's major life activity as to the
"conditions, manner, or duration under which [the activity] can be
performed in comparison to most people."" 9 For example, according to the
Senate Report discussing the ADA, "[a] person who can walk for 10 miles
continuously is not substantially limited in walking merely because on the
114. Tracey I. Levy, Legal Obligations and Workplace Implications for Institutions of
Higher Education Accommodating Learning Disabled Students, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 85, 111
(2001) (citation omitted).
115. Thomas D'Agostino, Defining "Disability'" under the ADA: Revised and Expanded
1997 Edition iii (LRP Publications 1997).
116. See supra Part II B (explaining the EEOC's definition of 'substantially limited').
117. This Congressional Committee developed the ADA's structure.
118. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) at 52 (1990).
119. Id. "'Most people' can be reasonably interpreted to mean that the individual is
restricted to a greater degree than a majority of people[,]" and is equivalent to the standard
of comparison to the "average person" recommended by the EEOC. Price v. Nat'l Bd. of
Med. Exam'r, 966 F.Supp. 419, 425-27 (S.D.W.Va. 1997) (citations omitted).
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eleventh mile, he or she begins to experience pain because most people
would not be able to walk eleven miles without experiencing some
discomfort.""1 '
However, the courts fail to compare an individual to the average
person in the population when determining if he or she is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. 121 In reference to the major
life activity of working, courts instead assess whether an individual is
"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes, as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills, and abilities.' 22 An individual's ability
to perform the major life activity of working is only considered if the
individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life
activity. 123 This standard is rarely considered for individuals with learning
disabilities since working is not the only major life activity they would
experience limitations in.
124
It is insufficient to prove an individual has a disability under the ADA
by demonstrating that a particular impairment prevents that individual from
performing up to his or her capacity. 25  The ADA uses the term in a
narrower fashion to cover only those people who are substantially limited
in a major life activity. Major life activity is measured by "tasks central to
most people's daily lives" and not by the unique needs of a particular
position. 26 "The law [only] compels accommodation for someone who is
'disabled' as that term is used in the [ADA], but not for everyone who may
have a condition described as a 'learning disability."", 127 Therefore, an
individual will only be deemed to be covered by the ADA if his disability
does not enable him to perform to the level of an average person.
28
Because courts fail to examine the discrepancy between an
individual's own ability and achievement, many problems are posed for the
learning disabled who statistically have average to superior intelligence.
29
For example, the ability to learn at an average level exempts a learning
disabled individual from recovery, despite the fact that the individual's
success might be largely due to the accommodations he has received.'30
120. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) at 52 (1990) (emphasis added).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(2005).
122. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
123. EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20)(2005).
124. Abram, supra note 69, at 121 (indicating that learning disabled individuals also
experience limitation in the scholastic setting).
125. Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200-201 (2002).
126. Id. at 200.
127. Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 379 F.3d 1097, 1109 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004).
128. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 201.
129. Gerber, supra note 8, at 331.
130. Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 61.
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While evidence of past academic success is relevant to the ultimate factual
determination of whether an employee is disabled, it should by no means
entitle the employer to judgment as a matter of law. Otherwise, doctors or
lawyers could never be considered to have a learning disability because
admittance into medical or law school alone would automatically negate
their claim. 3 '
B. Cases that Demonstrate Obstacles for the Learning Disabled Posed
by the EEOC's Interpretation of "Substantially Limited"
Hopkins v. St. Joseph's Creative Beginning, a recent case in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, illustrates how courts incorrectly assume
that an individual cannot be substantially limited compared to the average
person if he participates in activities in which the above average person
participates. 112 Mary Hopkins was diagnosed with a learning disability that
interfered with her ability to understand abstract concepts, relationships,
and written material.' Hopkins submitted a recent doctor's psychological
evaluation to her employer, documenting her learning disability and
explaining her limitations. 3 4 These documentations note that she received
a score of seventy-six on an I.Q. test, putting her in the fifth percentile.'35
Additionally, the psychological evaluation found that Hopkins received a
below average score in verbal skills and was considered impaired in the
areas of arithmetic, abstract verbal thinking, and reasoning processes. 1
3 6
Hopkins alleged that she was substantially impaired in her ability to
read and learn and was discriminated against because of her learning
disabilities."' As evidence of discrimination, she claimed that before
submitting her psychological evaluation to her employer, she was a highly
regarded employee and had received positive reviews."' After informing
her employer of her learning disability, Hopkins alleged that she began to
receive repeated warnings about her carelessness on the job, which resulted
in her termination. 139
The court found that Hopkins' reading and learning disability was
akin to a 'mere difference' rather than a substantial impairment when
131. See Wong, 379 F.3d. at 1113 (noting that admission into a medical school would
definitively disprove the existence of a learning disability) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Hopkins v. St. Joseph's Creative Beginning, No. 02-6791, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21033, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2003).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *6.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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compared to the average person, 140 dismissing the case on summary
judgment. 14' Even though Hopkins' psychological evaluation claimed she
was below average in many areas of learning, the court relied on the fact
that Hopkins'. doctor merely made recommendations as to how she might
improve her performance in college courses. 142 Thus, the court concluded
that the doctor's reports did not suggest that Hopkins was substantially
impaired in any activity besides taking difficult college courses. 43  In
determining that Hopkins was not substantially limited in her ability to
learn and read, the court additionally relied on evidence that Hopkins was
taking college courses and working towards earning a college degree, had
extensive employment history, and was currently a Sunday school teacher
at her church.' 44 Thus, the court incorrectly concluded that Hopkins could
not be substantially limited compared to the average person because of
such accomplishments. 
145
The EEOC's interpretation of 'substantially limited' poses similar
barriers for individuals with ADD and ADHD attempting to recover under
the Act. In Demar v. Car-Freshner Corp.,4 6 a United States District Court
case from the Northern District of New York, Demar brought an action
against his employer for denying him accommodations for ADHD and for
subsequently discharging him after learning of his disability. 14' The court
found that Demar failed to establish that he was substantially limited in his
ability to concentrate, despite his allegations that compared to the average
person he could not "concentrate in normal duration or under normal
conditions . . . [because his ADHD] restricts his ability to screen out
distractions.' 4 s
The court noted that Demar's diagnosis of ADHD alone does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that his ability to concentrate is
substantially limited. 149  Rather, Demar bears the burden of providing
evidence to prove that his ability to concentrate is limited in comparison to
the average person. 50 In concluding that Demar failed to meet this burden,
140. Plaintiff scored in the 18th percentile for Broad Reading and in the 6th percentile for
Reading Comprehension. Id.
141. Id. at*12.
142. Id. Hopkins' doctor suggested that she avoid classes that emphasize abstract
concepts, principles, and logic, and that she should be considered a candidate for un-timed
tests. Id.
143. Id. at *13.
144. Id. at* 14.
145. See id.
146. Demar v. Car-Freshner Corp., 49 F.Supp.2d 84 (D.N.Y. 1999).
147. Id. at 86-87. Demar disclosed his disability after being informed of his boss's
concerns regarding his inattentiveness. Id.
148. Id. at 91.
149. Id.
150. Id. The court places a large burden on the plaintiff to come up with specific facts or
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the court considered that he had obtained a college degree and completed
his first year of law school as evidence that Demar was able to concentrate
as well as the average person. 5' As a result, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of Car-Freshner Corporation, stating that neither
Demar's "'conclusory statements, conjecture, [n]or speculation' suffices to
defeat summary judgment."'
' 52
Similarly, in a seventh circuit case, Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic
Limited, Davidson filed suit under the ADA, claiming that her employer
refused to accommodate her diagnosis of ADD.'53 When Davidson
interviewed for a job as a school psychologist, 5 4 she disclosed that she
struggles with ADD and requested specific accommodations, including a
portable dictaphone'55 and the ability to work after hours to complete her
work.5 6 Davidson was denied accommodations and discharged from her
job due to complaints that she was disorganized and consistently submitted
her dictation late, even though she explained to her employer that such
behavior resulted from her ADD and could be. prevented with
accommodations. 157
The court found no proof that the difficulty posed by Davidson's ADD
was any more severe than what the average person experiences.15' Even
though Davidson presented evidence of her lifetime struggle with ADD and
the accommodations that were necessary for her success in college and
graduate school, the court found insufficient evidence to determine that
ADD hampered her ability to learn in the workplace anymore than the
average person. 159
Finally, Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners also
demonstrates the impediments posed for academically successful
individuals with ADD in attempting to qualify as disabled. 60 Although this
case is outside the employment context, it is illustrative of the general
difficulty the learning disabled experience in recovering under the ADA
because of the standard of being compared to the average person in the
population.
evidence that demonstrates that he is substantially limited in his ability to concentrate in
comparison to the general population. Id.
151. Id. at 87.
152. Id. at 91 (quoting Kuluk v. City of N.Y., 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d. Cir. 1996)).
153. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic Ltd., 133 F.3d 499 (7t h Cir. 1998).
154. Appellant earned a master's degree in psychology from the University of
Wisconsin-Stout in 1990 and is a licensed school psychologist and counselor. Id. at 502.
155. Therapists were required to dictate patient notes for transcription by other staff
members, which was extremely time-consuming and difficult for Davidson. Id. at 503.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 504.
158. Id. at 505.
159. Id.
160. Price v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 424 (D.W. Va. 1997).
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In Price, three medical students brought suit against Marshall
University School of Medicine under the ADA, requesting the National
Board of Medical Examiners to provide each of them with additional time
for the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) and a
separate room in which to take the examination. 61  Each plaintiff was
diagnosed by the National Center of Higher Education for Learning
Problems with ADHD, and two of the three plaintiffs were diagnosed with
specific learning disabilities in written expression and reading. 1
62
The court denied the plaintiffs accommodations, holding that they
were not disabled under the ADA because they were able to learn as well
as or better than the average person. 63 The court found that even though
the plaintiffs had provided documentation of their diagnoses, such
documentation was insufficient to support a definition of a disability under
the ADA because the plaintiffs had not exhibited a pattern of substantial
academic difficulties. 16" For example, the court reasoned that Plaintiff
Price was not disabled under the ADA because he was able to graduate
from high school with a 3.4 grade point average and from college with a
2.9 grade point average, discounting the fact that such success was due in
part to the accommodations he had received. 165 Also, because the plaintiffs
were medical students and the average person in the population is not
academically qualified to attend medical school, they were automatically
precluded from entitlement to accommodations, no matter how
substantially limiting their disabilities might be on their own abilities to
learn.166 Because an individual who has a college degree or a degree of
higher education has demonstrated greater skills in reading, writing, and
learning than the average person in the general population, the court's
holding in Price unfairly punishes individuals with learning disabilities for
academic achievement.
67
161. Id. at 421.
162. Id. at 422.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 423.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Susan M. Denbo, Disability Lessons in Higher Education: Accommodating
Learning-Disabled Students and Student-Athletes Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 145, 163 (2003). The Eastern District of
Michigan also addressed a similar case brought by a medical student with learning
disabilities, claiming the National Board of Medical Examiners discriminated against him
by denying him additional time to take the USMLE. Gonzalez v. Nat'l Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 60 F. Supp. 2d. 703 (E.D. Mich. 1999). The court held for the Board, relying on
Plaintiffs record of academic achievements and his medical degree in determining that he
was not substantially limited in his ability to learn compared to the average person. Id.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Courts' interpretation of the EEOC regulations turns the central
purposes of the ADA around "by holding that, as a matter of law, academic
success definitively disproves the existence of a learning disability. This
interpretation places individuals with disabilities in a classic Catch-22
situation."'6 s
For example, when Michael begins his job as an investment banker,
the intense pace will likely cause him frustration and difficulty. He will
find himself having no choice but to inform his employer of his learning
disabilities and to request particular accommodations. Given most
employers' general unwillingness to understand and accommodate what is
often believed to be nothing more than an imaginary impairment, the
investment bank Michael works for will most likely not comply with his
request. 169
If Michael wishes to file suit against his employer for failing to
provide him with accommodations, the ADA will not provide him with any
protection.70 Michael's academic success will negate his claim of being
substantially limited in the major life activity of learning because the
current comparison group used by the court, the average person in the
population, does not graduate from a national university with a B+ average.
Despite Michael's documented diagnosis and the testimony at trial by his
college disability office explaining the severity of his impairments, the fact
that Michael is able to both attend and perform well in college will
outweigh his claim of a substantial impairment.' 7' Thus, under the current
standard, Michael is unable to receive any protection under the ADA,
despite the extent of his learning disabilities and the fact that his academic
success is due in part to the accommodations he receives in college.
The current standard unfairly suggests that a learning disabled student
who has earned a decent grade point average at a national university will
not be entitled to accommodations since his academic record is superior to
that of the average individual. Since the court only examines how the
individual functions in comparison to the average person, this standard
precludes learning disabled individuals who have remarkably achieved
academic success from receiving accommodations under the ADA. Such
reasoning fails to take into account an important factor - how severe a
168. Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 379 F.3d 1097, 1110 (Cal. 2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
169. See supra Part lII, Section A ("[E]mployers constantly question the legitimacy of an
employee who does not appear to be disabled, but claims to be.").
170. See supra Part IV. (Courts show a "continuous refusal to find protection for the
learning disabled under the ADA").
171. Wong 379 F.3dat 1097.
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particular disability may be to the individual's own ability to learn.' Due
to educational difficulties, few learning disabled students are able to
continue to post-secondary education.17 3 Rather than punish those that have
accomplished more than the average person, courts should recognize that
such achievements are largely due to accommodations, and help the
learning disabled to continue to succeed by providing them with similar
protection in the workplace..
A. Why a Similarly Qualified Person Instead of the Average Person
Should Become the Comparison Group
The nature of learning disabilities would support using similarly
educated individuals in the comparison group rather than the average
person in the general population. The pivotal difference between the test
for substantial impairment in most major life activities and the test for
substantial impairment in the major life activity of working is the
appropriate demographic group to which the plaintiff is compared. 
174
When assessing whether a learning disability qualifies for protection under
the ADA, courts should use the demographic group they use for the major
life activity of working and compare individuals to the average person with
comparable training, skills, and abilities.'75 This proposed comparison
group would create a crucial distinction in a case where the plaintiffs
history of self-accommodation has allowed him to achieve great
accomplishments. 1
7 6
Assessing learning disabilities under this proposed standard would
entail a lack of deference to the EEOC. Many courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, have continually refused to defer to the EEOC's ADA
regulations.'77 As a result, the regulations have regularly been a "victim of
the agency's historic second-class status; the courts continue to disregard
its [the EEOC's] regulations and guidance, even when a very strong case
can be made that Congress intended courts to give deference to those rules
172. See id. (explaining that while Wong was able to achieve academic success without
accommodations, the court did not take into account how much more he may have achieved
with accommodations).
173. Brown, supra note 7, at 153.
174. See supra Part V (discussing how comparing a person's success with the average
person is an unfair assessment of the person's abilities and how a learning disability may be
negatively impacting that potential).
175. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii)(2004) (defining "substantially limited" as
significantly impaired or lack of ability as compared to the average person).
176. See Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(discussed infra Part V B).
177. Colker, supra note 75, at 135.
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under the ADA."' 78 Therefore, it is permissible for courts to disregard the
agency guidelines in evaluating learning disabilities under the ADA.'79
1. How the Proposed Standard Would Help the Learning Disabled
Prevail Under the Act
An example of how the proposed standard would enable learning-
disabled employees to recover is demonstrated in the New York District
Court case Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners.8 While
the decision in this case was vacated in part, it illustrates how plaintiffs will
benefit by using the comparison group of similarly educated individuals
that this article proposes.81
Bartlett, a dyslexic law school graduate, failed the bar exam four times
without special accommodation. 8 2  She failed a fifth time after being
granted "time and a half.' 83 Requesting that the next time she take the
exam she receive double time, permission to tape-record her essays, and the
opportunity to circle the multiple choice answers in the test booklet rather
than use a scantron, Bartlett was denied all accommodations and
subsequently brought suit under the ADA. Bartlett alleged that she
qualified for accommodations because dyslexia substantially impaired her
ability to learn, read, write, and work.
184
The Court held, as it had in many similar cases, that Bartlett was not
disabled in the major life activities of reading and writing, even though
dyslexia is a condition that specifically impedes one's ability to read and
write. "'85 The Court's conclusion was based on the fact that by earning a
178. Id. at 136.
179. Cf Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). See also Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999) (providing examples of cases where the Supreme Court has disregarded the EEOC
guidelines in interpreting the ADA).
180. 970 F.Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 156 F.3d 321
(2nd Cir. 1998).
181. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment in part, finding that appellee was
entitled to reasonable accommodations, but that it was error for the district court to reach the
issue of whether Bartlett was disabled in her ability to work. The judgment was vacated and
remanded to determine the proper amount of compensatory damages. Bartlett v. N.Y. State
Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 324 (2nd Cir. 1998). See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20)
(2006) ("If an individual is substantially limited in any other major life activity, no
determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially limited in
working.").
182. Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 970 F.Supp. 1094, 1102
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2nd Cir. 1998).
183. Id. at 1103.
184. Id. at 1098, 1102.
185. Id. at 1121.
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bachelor of science, a master's degree in education, and a law degree,
86
Bartlett had demonstrated skills that were superior to those of the general
population.'87  The Court reasoned that Bartlett's "history of self-
accommodation has allowed her to achieve great accomplishments, one of
which includes roughly average reasoning skills (on some measures) when
compared to the general population."'' 88  Bartlett's impressive
achievements, due to the coping mechanisms she had developed and the
accommodations she had previously received to mitigate the effects of her
dyslexia, cut against her claim that she was disabled under the ADA. 1'8 9
However, when applying the definition of "substantially limited"
contained in the EEOC regulations for the major life activity of working,
the Court found Bartlett to be disabled when compared to the other students
who had comparable training, skills, and abilities.' 90 When using this
comparison group, a completely different evaluation of Bartlett's abilities
emerges. All of Bartlett's tremendous accomplishments are pushed aside
when compared to this population and Bartlett is determined to read at a
level much less than the average law student.' 91
The judge in Bartlett, in agreeing that the proper comparison group
used to assess her disability should be people with comparable educational
achievement, relied on the fact that "in 1993, 21.9% of the adult U.S.
population had graduated from a four-year college. In 1994, less than one
half of one percent of the adult population . . . were lawyers."'192  As
demonstrated in this case, the comparison group that is used in the Court's
assessment of a plaintiffs impairment is determinative of whether the
186. At Vermont Law School, Bartlett had received time and a half for examinations, use
of a yellow legal pad for exams, and permission to circle her multiple choice answers rather
than filling out a scantron sheet. Id. at 1101.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1120.
189. Levy, supra note 113, at 95.
190. Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 970 F.Supp. 1094, 1121, 1126
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd in part and vacated in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2nd Cir. 1998). The Court
reasoned that the bar exam was an employment test and so the appropriate demographic
group to which Bartlett should be compared "is a group of individuals with similar
background, skills, and abilities .. " Id. at 1126. The N.Y. Court of Appeals later found it
was error for the district court to reach the issue of whether Bartlett was disabled in her
ability to work. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 324 (2nd Cir.
1998). See also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2j) (2006) ("If an individual is substantially limited
in any other major life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the
individual is substantially limited in working.").
191. Additionally, the Court determined that Bartlett's dyslexia substantially limited her
ability to participate in a broad class of jobs because, without accommodations on the bar
examination, she would be precluded from the entire field of law practice. Bartlett, 970
F.Supp. at 1121, 1123. The Court considered the practice of law to be a broad class of jobs.
Id. at 1121.
192. Bartlett, 970 F.Supp. at 1126.
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plaintiff meets the definition of "disabled" under the ADA.' 93 When
compared to a population of similarly educated individuals, Bartlett's
reading skills are well below normal, but when compared to the general
population, Bartlett is squarely average.
194
B. Implications of the Proposed Standard
1. Accommodating More Employees with Learning Disabilities
Should Not Pose an Undue Hardship on Employers
While Title I does not require an employer to make any
accommodations that would impose an 'undue hardship' on the
employer,' 95 a high standard exists for employers attempting to utilize this
affirmative defense. 96 While an undue hardship is vaguely defined by the
EEOC regulations as a "significant difficulty or expense incurred by a
covered entity,"' 97 Congress has additionally provided some guidance,
stating that an undue hardship "may be something less than a cost that
would drive the employer to the verge of going out of business," but at the
same time it must impose more than a negligible cost.' 98 The Court's
analysis has centered on balancing the business needs of employers against
the rights of individuals with disabilities.' 99
Four factors must be balanced:
(1) the nature and cost of the accommodation; (2) the overall
financial resources of the facilities involved, the number of
persons employed at these facilities, and the accommodation's
impact on the facilities' operation; (3) the overall financial
resources of the business, the number of employees, and the
number, type and location of its facilities; and (4) the type of
business operation, including the structure and functions of its
193. See supra Part V. (arguing that the comparison group should include similarly
educated individuals for determining if an individual is disabled under the ADA, rather than
the average person in the general population). Cf Bartlett, 970 F.Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (demonstrating how using different comparison groups can yield different results).
194. Bartlett, 970 F.Supp. at 1121.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
196. See Michael A. Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53
DUKE L.J. 79, 83 (2003) (discussing what factors should be taken into consideration in the
balancing test for undue burden and what accommodations society ought to support).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (p)(1) (2004).
198. Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1450 (1991).
199. Leslie Goddard, Searching for Balance in the ADA: Recent Developments in the
Legal and Practical Issues of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 227, 231
(1999).
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workforce, and the geographic, administrative, or fiscal
relationship between the facilities involved and the business as a
whole. °°
These four factors are not exclusive.20' Congress also indicated that other
factors, including the availability of financial assistance or tax credits to
help pay for an accommodation, and the number of employees sharing the
benefit of an accommodation are to be considered.0 2
Congress also specifically adopted a much more burdensome standard
for an employer claiming undue hardship under the ADA than it had under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.203 As a result, it can be assumed
that Congress recognized that the ADA would require great expenditures
on employers, so an expansion of the definition of a learning-disabled
plaintiff would not exceed the scope of the ADA. Senator Lowell Weicker,
in consideration of the social costs that would stem from excluding
disabled individuals from the pursuit of their chosen professions, boldly
stated that "the costs associated with this bill are a small price to pay for
opening up our society to persons with disabilities.' 2° Congress itself has
even stated that the cost of discrimination far exceeds the costs of
eliminating it.205  Accordingly, Congress concluded that it was
inappropriate to focus on the cost of compliance by covered entities given
"[tlhe economic benefits to society in terms of reductions in the deficit
from getting people off of welfare, out of institutions, and onto the tax
rolls.
206
Additionally, a large percentage of the situations covered under Title I
of the ADA involve accommodation with negligible costs to the
employer.20 7  In fact, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
200. David Harger, Drawing the Line Between Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reducing the Effects of Ambiguity on
Small Businesses, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 783, 787 (1993).
201. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 69 (1990).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 68; see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 36 (1989) (emphasizing the inapplicability of
the standards from Title VII religion cases). Under Title VII, an employer is not required to
provide accommodations for employees' religious beliefs if doing so creators undue
hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)(2000).
204. 134 CONG. REc. S5109 (daily ed.April 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker).
205. 135 CONG. REC. H2440 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fish). It is
interesting to note that some scholars contend that the legislative history infers that
Congress never intended for the ADA to encompass a cost-based analysis. See Armen H.
Merjian, Bad Decisions Make Bad Decisions: Davis, Arline and Improper Application of
the Undue Financial Burden Defense Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (1999) (contending that Congress did not intend,
except in very limited instances, to allow for cost-based determination in regards to
providing accommodations for the disabled).
206. 135 CONG. REc. S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
207. Harger, supra note 200, at 790.
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Resources estimated that the cost of an ADA accommodation would be less
than 100 dollars per worker for 30% of disabled workers, with 51% of such
accommodations requiring no expense at all. 208  The lowest costs were
associated with the types of accommodations often implemented for the
learning disabled: relocating work-sites, changing hours, work procedures,
task assignments, and transferring workers to new jobs.209
In addition to the obvious gain to individual employees, economists
contend that ADA accommodations will also create efficiencies for
employers.21° Studies suggest that overall profitability improves when
accommodations provide individual employees with greater potential for
success.211 Indeed, one federal agency found that "on average, for every
dollar spent on accommodation, companies saved $50 in net benefits."2 '2
Companies also received net benefits greater than $5,000 in two-thirds of
cases where accommodations were under $500.2 3 These figures were
"based on quantitative evidence finding that disabled workers receiving
accommodations had lower job turnover .rates and equivalent or lower
absenteeism rates, thus saving their employers replacement expenses.,
214
Other economic benefits, termed 'ripple effects' also result when
employers provide accommodations. 215 These include greater productivity
and dedication, and a stronger corporate culture.2t6
208. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 89 (1989). Another study led by Professor Peter Blanck
additionally concludes that many of the necessary expenses under the ADA are "recurrently
nonexistent or minimal." Stein, supra note 197, at 103. From 1978 to 1997, Blanck
examined 500 accommodations made by Sears, Roebuck and Co., concluding that the
average-out of pocket expense was about $120 for each accommodation. Id. "From 1993 to
1996 that average dropped to $45. Overall, 72 percent of accommodations required no cost
.... " Id.
209. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
ADA: Selected Issues, C.A.32 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 319, 333 n.112 (1995).
210. Stein, supra note 197, at 83.
211. Id. at 104.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see also James G. Frierson, The Legality of Medical Exams and Health
Histories of Current Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J.
REHABILITATION ADMIN. 83, 86 (1993) (describing how one company saved $4 million
annually by providing necessary accommodations for their disabled employees).
214. Stein, supra note 197, at 104-105; see also Peter D. Blanck & Mollie W. Marti,
Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 VILL. L. REv. 345, 378 (1997) (arguing that positive benefits of employing disabled
workers are widespread).
215. Stein, supra note 197, at 105.
216. Id. Beyond these ripple effects, accommodations may also result in "positive
externalities," including public cost savings. Id. at 106.
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2. Congressional Intent Supports the Use of the Proposed
Comparison Group
While the proposed comparison group expands the scope of the ADA
by offering protection for more individuals, allowing the definition of
"disability" a more generous construction is necessary to be faithful to the
remedial purpose of the ADA.2"7 Justice Stevens has argued that the "forty-
three million Americans suffer[ing] from disabilities" cited by Congress in
voicing the need for the ADA was not intended to be a fixed cap on the
Act's protected class. 21 Justice Stevens had stated that, coverage of the
Act should not be confined simply "because an interpretation of 'disability'
that adheres to Congress' method of defining the class it intended to benefit
may also provide protection for 'significantly larger numbers' of
individuals than estimated in the Act's findings."' 19
Legal scholars have also contended that it is a more desirable option to
allow the ADA "to cover a larger scope of the population than Congress
intended" than limiting the Act's coverage so that some who should be
entitled are not.2  It has been suggested that the ADA's purpose is to
"afford equal opportunity to qualified individuals with disabilities; it is not
to deny opportunity to the disabled solely because meeting the prerequisites
of qualification demonstrate their abilities. 22'
Additionally, when deciding Bragdon v. Abbott,222 which expanded
the scope of the ADA to include individuals substantially limited in their
ability to reproduce, the Supreme Court recognized that this decision could
possibly result in more litigation and an increased workload for the courts
and the EEOC. 223 However, the Court acknowledged that even though an
expansion of the class of disabled persons may produce some negative
results, the clear intent of Congress was to protect all disabled individuals
from discrimination.224 Like the Bragdon decision, this article's proposed
217. Stephanie Beige, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. The Supreme Court "Substantially
Limits " the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 TOuRO L. REV. 1441, 1455 (2000).
218. Id. at 1462
219. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 504 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Beige, supra note 217, at 1462.
221. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 379 F.3d 1097, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). When an individual meets the prerequisites of a challenging job
position that requires skill, establishing qualification proves the individual is not impaired,
which makes it virtually impossible for him to qualify as disabled under the ADA. Id. at
1110.
222. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
223. Robert C. Mathes, Civil Rights-The Status of Persons Infected With Asymptomatic
HIV Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 After Bragdon-Did the Supreme
Court Miss An Opportunity to Protect Disabled Americans?, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV.
237, 254 (1999).
224. Id. at 261.
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standard of comparison captures the necessity of allowing the ADA a
"generous, rather than a miserly, construction" to ensure faithfulness to the
ADA's remedial purpose. 225  Furthermore, the Court has "consistently
construed [other anti-discrimination] statutes to include comparable evils
within their coverage, even when the particular evil at issue was beyond
Congress' immediate concern in passing the legislation. 226 For example,
Justice Stevens calls attention to the fact that Congress' primary concern in
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964227 was to eliminate
discrimination against African-Americans, "[b]ut that narrow focus could
not possibly justify a construction of the statute that excluded Hispanic-
Americans or Asian-Americans from its protection.,
228
If the ADA is to provide a comprehensive mandate to eliminate
discrimination, "then broad application is necessary. Nowhere does the
language of the ADA require that its application be limited to a narrow
class of individuals. '229  With this purpose in mind, and the "familiar
canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be
construed broadly to effectuate its purposes, ' '23° a broader interpretation of
the ADA is necessary. To construct the Act any differently would
disregard its legislative history and leave a class of individuals it was
intended to protect completely defenseless. 3
VII. CONCLUSION
So what will happen to Michael if the standard of comparison this
Comment proposes is adopted? Michael will have the opportunity to
succeed as an investment banker, as he will finally receive the protection to
which he is entitled under the ADA. Rather than be compared to the
average person in the population, Michael will be compared to others with
225. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 505.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
228. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 505; see also United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979) (noting that a central goal in enacting Title VII was to
prevent discrimination against African Americans). Additionally, the Supreme Court even
prohibited racial discrimination against whites and male-on-male sexual harassment in
private employment, even though these were not the principal evils Congress was concerned
with when it enacted Title VII. Julie McDonnell, Sutton v. United Airlines: Unfairly
Narrowing the Scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 471, 484
(2000).
229. McDonnell, supra note 229, at 484. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (stating
the relevant ADA provision cited by McDonnell).
230. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
231. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990)(stating that disability should not be
assessed with regard to mitigating circumstances, but that those with impairments should be
covered by the Act).
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similar skills and backgrounds - individuals with college diplomas.
2 32
When using this comparison group, Michael will be able to receive
accommodations in the workplace, for his learning disabilities are clearly
substantially impairing him when compared to other college graduates.233
While courts have been concerned that comparing the plaintiff to
individuals with similar a background, skills, and abilities would be
unmanageable, employees with learning disabilities who sue under the
current Title I definition of "substantially limited" are unable to win their
lawsuits.234 The virtual impossibility of a learning disabled employee's
recovery should be of greater concern to the courts since the purpose of the
ADA is to provide individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of a disability with legal recourse to redress such discrimination.235
The proposed comparison group supports the overall purpose of the ADA,
which is "to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency" for individuals with disabilities.236
In adopting the ADA, President George H.W. Bush stated that
"[d]iscrimination, whether on the basis of race, national origin, sex,
religion, or disability, is worse than wrong. It is a fundamental evil that
tears at the fabric of our society., 237  Using a comparison group of
individuals with comparable training, skills, and abilities in assessing
learning disabled employees would destroy the evil of discrimination that
lies ahead for the 5 million children in America that currently struggle with
learning disabilities.235
232. See supra Part IV (explaining that the comparison group used by the EEOC
excludes learning disabled individuals from protection under the ADA, unlike the
comparison group proposed by this comment).
233. This evidence is based on Michael's doctor's documentation of the limitations
resulting from his learning disability, which Michael wishes to remain confidential.
234. See supra Part IV (explaining several cases which demonstrate the difficulties of the
EEOC's interpretation of "substantially limited" on plaintiffs with learning disabilities).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (2000).
236. Denbo, supra note 167, at 173 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994).
237. Lerner, supra note 57, at 1049.
238. See Summary Health Statistics for US. Children: National Health Interview Survey
2002, Series 10, No. 221 (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr ]O/srl10_221.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
